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This paper studies whether the degree of women’s representation in Swedish local councils 
affects local public expenditure patterns. To empirically address the question, I first analyze 
the differences in preferences between men and women expressed by elected local council 
representatives using survey  data. This enables me to make precise predictions about the 
effects  of  women’s  representation  on  spending.  The  subsequent  panel  study  on  the 
composition of public spending in Swedish municipalities supports the predictions derived 
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1. Introduction 
Do all groups have to be represented in elected assemblies for their interests to be 
taken into account? In the public debate, this is often claimed to be the case. Yet if 
political representation is necessary for one’s interests being taken into account, it is 
implicitly assumed that the elected representative, at least to some degree, can pursue 




This study investigates whether women’s representation shapes actual policy choices 
in Swedish municipalities. Using survey data on the preferences of politicians in local 
governments, I first investigate if and how the preferences of men and women differ. 
This approach allows me to derive a set of precise hypotheses about the effects of 
gender on policy choices. This is of great merit. Instead of postulating à priori in what 
way men’s and women’s preferences differ, I derive clear predictions about the effect 
of women’s representation on spending from the preference study. Then, I analyze the 
actual allocation of spending in all Swedish municipalities. The results indicate that 
the share of women on a local council indeed has a significant effect on spending 
decisions. As predicted by the preference study, a larger share of women in the local 
council increases spending on childcare and education relative to elderly care. 
 
Theoretically,  there  is  no  clear  answer  as  to  whether  the  elected  representative’s 
gender is of importance for policy choices. Electoral incentives will to some degree 
encourage the elected representative to act according to the interest of the electorate, 
rather than his or her own interest. However, when electoral incentives are weak, it is 
theoretically  plausible  that  politicians’  preferences  affect  policy  choices,  and  the 
bargaining  strength  of  a  group  of  politicians  with  similar  preferences  will  be  of 
importance for the allocation of resources (see e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 2000).  
 
A basic prerequisite for representation of women to matter for policy is that men and 
women  have  different  preferences  regarding  policy.  There  is  ample  evidence 
                                                            
1 In the year 2005, e.g., only 16 percent of national parliament members worldwide were women 
(Ballington and Karam, 2005).   2 
suggesting that this is the case. Surveys of men and women’s preferences using pools 
show that women are more concerned about social policy issues (see e.g. Funk and 
Garthmann,  2006,  and,  for  evidence  on  Swedish  data,  Oskarson  and  Wängnerud, 
1995).  Among elected representatives  there are also  documented  differences.  In a 
study of Swedish MPs, Esaiasson and Holmberg (1993) find that female MPs were 
significantly more positive towards daycare centers and an ecological society than 
men.  This  paper  also  finds  that  there  are  important  differences  in  the  stated 
preferences of men and women.  
 
Given  that  men  and  women’s  preferences  differ,  the  question  is  if  representation 
matters for policy. Greater representation of women in the electorate has been shown 
to  be  important.  A  strand  of  the  literature  on  women’s  representation  studies  the 
impact  of  gender  composition  of  the  electorate  on  fiscal  outcomes.  By  using  the 
introduction  of  suffrage  as  an  exogenous  change  to  the  composition  of  the 
constituency, the studies are able to show an effect of women on policy. A general 
finding  is  that  women  prefer  higher  social  spending  then  men  (see  e.g.  Lott  and 
Kenny, 1999, Abrams and Settle, 1999 and Toke and Dallal, 2008).  
 
The question studied in this paper is whether women’s representation in the elected 
assembly  matters  for  policy?  Chattopadhyay  and  Duflo  (2004)  find  women’s 
representation to be important when studying local-level spending patterns in India. 
To establish a causal effect, they use the fact that one third of all leadership positions 
of Village Councils in West Bengal was randomly assigned to women. Besley and 
Case  (2003)  use  panel  data  on  U.S.  states  and  find  that  women’s  representation 
increases spending on family assistance and strengthens child support provision. None 
of these papers include information about legislator preference and it is implied that 
changes in policy are attributed to changes in representation. Sorensen (1995) on the 
other hand uses the same methodology as this study. He first asks the politicians what 
their preferences are over different sectors and focuses on party affiliation and public 
sector  employment,  finding  that  although  preferences  are  correlated  with  party 
affiliation and public sector employment, the representation of different groups has a 
limited impact on the spending pattern. This paper contributes to the literature on 
women’s  representation  in  elected  assemblies  by  relating  the  stated  preference  of  
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elected representatives, derived from a survey, to the revealed preference of spending 
decisions. 
 
Most political economy models show that electoral incentives will reduce the impact 
of a politician’s preferences on policy choices. Empirical literature has found that 
strong political competition seems to keep politicians in power from furthering their 
own interests, rather than the interests of the general public (see e.g. Kalt and Zupan, 
1984, 1990, Besley et al, 2007, Besley and Case, 2003 and Svaleryd and Vlachos, 
2007). This paper also provides evidence suggesting that political competition limits 
elected representatives from pursuing their own interest by showing that the effect of 
women’s representation is smaller when political competition is strong. 
 
A  major  advantage  with  studying  Swedish  municipalities  is  that  since  they  work 
within the same legal and institutional system, many of the problems associated with 
cross-country  studies  are  avoided.  Still,  local  governments  enjoy  considerable 
autonomy  from  the  national  government,  they  set  their  own  budget  and  exercise 
powers of taxation. That the autonomy from central government is not just formal has 
been shown in several empirical studies (e.g. Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008 and Svaleryd 
and Vlachos, 2007).  
 
The paper is organized as follows. I first (see Section 2) examine the relationship 
between gender and preferences using survey data on the elected representatives in 28 
Swedish municipalities. Then (Section 3) I study the effect of women’s representation 
on actual local public expenditure in all Swedish municipalities, using the predictions 
derived in Section 2. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. How do men’s and women’s preferences differ? 
To obtain predictions about the effect of women’s representation on policy choices, 
men’s and women’s preferences need to differ in a systematic way. If there are no 
differences between men’s and women’s spending preferences, there is no reason to 
expect  women’s  representation  in  the  local  council  to  be  of  importance  for  the 
municipality’s spending pattern. 
   4 
Why then would women and men’s preferences differ? Men and women do different 
things  in  the  household  which  could  affect  their  spending  preferences  of  public 
resources. For example, women stay home with small children to a much larger extent 
than men. As mentioned in the Introduction, there is also ample evidence that men’s 
and women’s preferences differ over policy choices. In order to establish possible 
gender  differences  in  preferences  among  politicians  in  Swedish  municipalities,  I 
employ a unique data set on the preferences expressed by elected representatives in 
Swedish municipalities in 1980 and 1993.
2  
 
This study will focus on spending on elderly care, education and childcare. There are 
three main reasons for choosing these sectors. First of all they constitute the lion’s 
share of municipal spending; second, the availability of the data is good; and third, 
municipalities are in principle the sole providers of these services. 
 
2.1. Data  
Elected representatives in 25 municipalities in 1980 and 28 municipalities in 1993 
(about 10 percent of the local councils) were asked to participate in the survey.
3 The 
municipalities  were  chosen  by  the  original  researcher  to  mirror  the  demographic, 
economic and political differences across municipalities in Sweden. Since the focus is 
on the local councils, only respondents who are members, or replacement deputies, in 
the  local  council  are  included,  leaving  me  with  around  1910  observations.  The 
assumption will be that the preferences of these politicians are representative of the 
views of elected representatives in Swedish local councils. A closer examination of 
the  average  values  of  the  variables  used  in  the  subsequent  study  of  municipality 
spending  patterns  shows  that  there  are  negligible  differences  between  those 
municipalities that were included in the study and those which were not. For example, 
the average share of women in the local council in the year 1980 was 27.79 percent, in 
the sample of municipalities included in the survey, and 27.97 percent in the sample 
                                                            
2 The data set is handled and distributed by The Swedish Social Science Data Service at Gothenburg 
University. Gunnar Wallin, Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, originally collected 
the material in “Kommunalpolitikerundersökningen” 1979-1980 and Henry Bäck, Department of 
Social Science, Stockholm University, originally collected the material in 
“Kommunalpolitikerundersökningen” 1993.  Neither Swedish Social Science Data Service, nor Gunnar 
Wallin and Henry Bäck bear any responsibility for the analysis or interpretation of the data as 
presented in this paper.  
3 The answering rate was about 75 percent.  
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of municipalities not included. For the year 1993, the average was 33.74 and 33.24 
percent  respectively.  Moreover,  the  results  of  the  preferences  study  should  be 
representative for the period since the following study of actual public expenditure 
will use data from 1976 to 1997. 
 
The  primary  purpose  of  the  original  survey  was  to  study  elected  representatives’ 
views on their political role and working routines in the local councils. However, the 
data collected also includes background information on gender, age, party affiliation, 
participation in organizations and position on the elected council. Most importantly, 
for my purpose, it also includes the politicians’ views on certain issues, and in what 
areas they thought the municipality should do more.  
 
For  each  area,  the  respondent  could  choose  from  three  different  answers:  “it  is 
important to do more than the municipality is doing now”; “the municipality’s efforts 
are sufficient”; or “the municipality’s efforts can be reduced.”
4 The answers will be 
interpreted  as  the  politicians’  spending  preferences  for  different  sectors.  Since 
municipalities in Sweden have power  over the size of the budget, and no  budget 
constraint was built into the questions, it is possible that some politicians answered 
that the municipality should do more (or less) in all areas. To remedy this problem, 
differences between answers are used and ordered into five categories. For example, 
the variable Childcare/Elderly care will take the value of 1 if the politician states that 
more should be done in elderly care and less in childcare. It will take the value of 2 
both if he/she indicates that it is important to do more in elderly care while the work 
in childcare is sufficient, and if he/she answers that elderly care spending is sufficient, 
but that spending on childcare can be reduced. If the respondent states that he/she 
would like to do more in all areas, it will be interpreted as this person is not placing a 
higher  priority  on  any  one  area  in  relation  to  another  and  the  variable 
Childcare/Elderly care will take the value of 3, and so on. The coding is illustrated in 
Table 1. 
 
(Table 1 here) 
 
                                                            
4 See the Appendix for the exact question.   6 
As can be seen in the summary statistics shown in appendix Table A:1, the mean of 
the variable Elderly/Child is 2.728. On average, elderly care is thus regarded as a 
more important sector than childcare. Whenever the mean is lower than 3, the sector 
in the numerator is, on average, regarded as less important than the sector in the 
denominator.  Judging  by  the  means  of  the  dependent  variables,  politicians  would 
especially like to spend more on elderly care at the expense of childcare. 
 
Should control variables be included when studying the correlation between gender 
and preferences over different sectors? Preferences are likely to be correlated with, 
and perhaps also determined by, personal characteristic such as age, education level, 
occupation, age of children and so forth. Men and women are likely to be different in 
these dimensions, which could be part of the reason why there are gender differences 
in preferences. In the subsequent study of the municipalities’ spending patterns I will 
not have access to any data on the characteristics of the elected representative apart 
from  gender  and  party  affiliation.  Thus,  the  gender  variables  will  pick  up  all  the 
differences  between  men  and  women  due  to  differences  in  age,  education  and 
occupation,  for  example.  Including  controls  other  then  party  affiliation  in  the 
preference study would remove some of the variation between men and women that I 
will study in the subsequent study of the municipalities’ spending patterns. As an 
example, suppose I include a control for age in the preference study thereby removing 
the effect of age on preferences. When studying the actual spending pattern I have no 
control for the age structure in the local council. Since the women in the council are 
on average younger, the representation variable will pick up both the effect of age and 
the effect of gender. Therefore, as long as the sample of politicians is representative 
for the population, it would be wrong to control for different personal characteristics 
that are correlated with gender.  
 
Factors that only affect the survey population should be included. For example, one 
concern may be that preferences are affected by the municipal spending pattern. To 
control for this I include municipal and year fixed effects. 
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2.2. Results 
The  effects  of  gender  on  the  stated  preferences  are examined  in an  ordered  logit 
model, controlling for party affiliation and municipality. Seeing that preferences for 
different sectors probably correlate with party affiliation, I include an indicator for 
when the individual belongs to a left-wing party.
5 To gain efficiency, I pool the data 
for the two periods and include a dummy for 1993 to control for possible changes in 
preferences over time.  
 
The results presented in Table 2 show that there is a clear effect of gender. Women, 
relative to men, regard childcare and education as more important sectors than elderly 
care.  Furthermore,  party  affiliation  is  evidently  correlated  with  preferences.  In 
comparison to right-wing politicians, left-wing politicians rank childcare as the most 
important area. Notice also that over time, the preferences have shifted in favor of 
spending on elderly care relative to both childcare and education.
6 
 
(Table 2 here) 
 
The sample is then divided along party lines to check whether the gender effect is 
different in left- and right-wing parties. In Tables 3 and 4, the results for left- and 
right-wing parties are presented, respectively. The effect of gender in left-wing parties 
is the same as for the total sample. Women, relative to men, prefer spending on child 
care and education relative to elderly care. 
 
(Table 3 here) 
 
In right-wing parties, however, women and men do not express different opinions 
concerning the relative importance of education contra elderly care. Rather, the results 
show that women prefer relatively more spending on childcare relative to all sectors. 
                                                            
5 Parties categorized as ' left-wing'  are the Left Party, the Social Democratic Party and the 
Environmental Party, and ' right-wing'  are the Moderate Party, the Liberal Party, the Christian 
Democratic Party, the Centre Party and New Democracy. This categorization follows Petersson (1992) 
and Svaleryd and Vlachos (2007). 
6 Due to the construction of the independent variables, some variation in preferences may be lost. 
Specifically, some respondents may have different preferences over the two sectors, but state that they 
prefer more (or less) spending in both sectors. In that case, my variable will indicate that the respondent 
does not prefer any sector relative to the other, thereby suggesting that the data fails to pick-up all the 
variation in preferences. To find out more about this effect, I study the gender profile for those cases 
where the respondent prefers more (or less) spending in both sectors. Interestingly, women are over-  8 
The  estimated  coefficient  on  childcare  relative  to  elderly  care  is  not  statistically 
significant on conventional levels, but the coefficient is in the same magnitude as in 
column  1.  Although,  the  result  should  be  interpreted  with  some  care,  due  to  the 
reduced sample, the results seem to indicate some differences between left-wing and 
right-wing parties.  
 
(Table 4 here) 
 
To sum up, the gender effect on the ranking of childcare versus elderly care appears to 
exist in both samples, although the effect differs somewhat between left-wing and 
right-wing politicians. In left-wing parties, gender seems to affect the importance of 
childcare  and  education  relative  to  elderly  care.  In  right-wing  parties,  the  main 
difference is the preference for childcare relative to elderly care. 
 
The study of politicians’ preferences indicates certain differences between men and 
women. If politicians can pursue their own interests, the strength of women in the 
local council should be reflected in the municipalities’ spending decisions. Notice that 
it would be incorrect to interpret the above result as suggesting that women regard 
childcare  as  the  service  with  highest  priority.  What  it  says  is  that  women  regard 
childcare as more important than men do. As a matter of fact, both female and male 
politicians express preferences for more spending on elderly care at the expense of 
childcare. Thus, if elected politicians could affect policy in accordance with these 
preferences, it should be reflected in a trend: over time, more resources should be 
allocated to elderly care and education at the expense of childcare.  
 
3. Local public spending 
Section 2 established a relationship between spending preferences and gender. The 
next step is to find out if politicians’ preferences are important for actual spending. 
3.1 Object of study ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ Swedish local governments 
The object of the empirical study is Swedish municipal spending, which constitutes 
more than 40 percent of Swedish public spending. Local governments in Sweden are 
                                                                                                                                                                      
represented (under-represented) as respondents preferring more (less) spending in both sectors. Thus 
women, relative to men, favor increased spending in all three sectors.  
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interesting  units  for  study  of  collective  choice,  because  they  enjoy  a  significant 
independence from national government. In fact, they have the constitutional right of 
self-governance. Moreover, several empirical studies have shown that they indeed act 
independently from the national government (see e.g. Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008 and 
Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2007). Another attractive feature is that local governments, in 
contrast  to  country-level  studies,  operate  in  the  same  political  framework,  i.e. 
politicians are likely to have roughly the same effect in all municipalities. 
 
Sweden has a parliamentary system and elections are held every third year
7. The seats 
are divided according to the proportion of votes the parties get in the local election. 
All major decisions, including all budgetary decisions, are taken in the local council 
by simple majority rule. As is common in this type of system, there are a number of 
different parties represented in the local councils. Even if there are several different 
parties, they are often categorized as belonging to the left-or right-wing bloc due to 
the division on state level.
8  
 
This study covers 272 municipalities in Sweden and spans the period 1976-97.
9 As 
mentioned  earlier,  the  study  focuses  on  spending  on  elderly  care,  education  and 
childcare. Since the preference study only provides predictions about the effects on 
relative spending in different sectors, the ratios of spending will be used as dependent 
variables.  
 
3.2 Specification of empirical model and data 
 
Empirically,  the  purpose  is  to  estimate  the  impact  of  female  politicians  on 
municipality spending patterns, while controlling for the municipality’s demographic 
composition.  This  allows  me  to  examine  whether  the  politician’s  identity  is  of 
importance for policy choices. It can also be seen as a weak test of different political 
economy models: if politicians can commit to policy, then the bargaining strength of 
women  in  the  local  council  should  not  affect  policy  decisions.  With  incomplete 
                                                            
7 Every fourth year from the 1994 election. 
8 To see which parties are categorized as left- wing and right-wing see footnote 5. 
9 It includes all municipalities except those that were split during the period and three municipalities 
with responsibilities usually handled by the county council.   10 
commitment, however, variations in political representation should have an effect. It 
is not clear how the bargaining strength of women on the local councils should be 
measured. Here, I will use the share of women on the local council as a proxy for 
women’s bargaining power over the budget process. Women in council is the number 
of women in the council divided by the total number of seats. This variable is constant 
over the election period. It should be a relevant proxy, since all budget decisions are 
taken by a simple majority vote in the local council. Other measures will also be used, 
including the share of women in the majority and dummy variables capturing non-
linear effects of representation.   
 
During this period, there has been an immense increase in women’s representation at 
all levels of Swedish government. In the election 1973, the average share of women in 
the local councils was only 17 percent, while in the last election studied it was up to 
41 percent. There is also considerable variation across municipalities. For example, 
after  the  1973  election,  only  2  percent  of  the  seats  were  occupied  by  women  in 
Högsby  and  Tjörn,  whereas  Järfälla  had  35  percent  women.  Also,  after  the  1994 
election, women’s representation on the council differs across municipalities, with 23 
percent in Torsås and 53 percent in Bollnäs. Notice, however, that only in the last 
election did women constitute a majority in some elected assemblies and then only in 
three local councils. The share of women in the majority is somewhat higher: in the 
last election, 30 municipalities had a local council where there where more female 
than male representatives in the majority. Almost all of these majorities were left-
wing. The ranking of municipalities according to women on the council has changed 
considerably  over  time.  One  example  is  Högsby,  which  had  the  lowest  share  of 
women on the council after the 1973 election and about the same share as Järfälla 
after the 1994 election (Järfälla was at the top of the table at the beginning of the 
period). The increase in the share of women on the council cannot therefore only be 
explained by a common trend.  
 
An important question concerns problems of simultaneity: there may be an omitted 
variable, such as a community-specific preference for equality, which affects both 
spending decisions and women’s representation. A preferred approach is to use some 
exogenous change in women’s representation that is not correlated with the spending 
decision (see e.g. Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004). There are no such changes in  
  11 
Sweden that can be used for identification during this period. Note, however, that 
voters  in  Sweden  could  not  directly  show  their  preferences  for a  female  or  male 
politician by voting for that candidate.
10  In the Swedish system, voters voted for a 
party list, not a candidate, and a voter had virtually no power to affect the names on 
the list as the order was entirely decided by the party. Moreover, parties at the local 
level had been under pressure from the national level to increase the share of women 
on the party list.  
 
When trying to explain spending on different services, one must try to control for 
differences in the need for the service. Since services such as childcare, education and 
elderly  care  are  directed  towards  certain  age  groups,  it  is  natural  to  control  for 
demographic structure. It is also possible that large age groups can exert political 
pressure on the local council to spend more on a service that benefits that particular 
group. In a  typical  median voter model, for  example, the service from which  the 
median voter benefits the most is of great importance for spending patterns (see e.g. 
Strömberg, 1999). I include the share of the population between the ages of 0 and 6 
when explaining spending on childcare, the share of the population between 7 and 15 
when explaining spending on basic education, and the share of the population older 
than 65 for spending on elderly care.  
 
The percentage of left-wing votes will be included, since it is likely to affect the 
municipality’s  allocation  of  resources.  The  rationale  is  twofold.  First,  given  that 
politicians can affect resource allocation, and that party affiliation has been shown to 
correlate with preferences, the bargaining strength of the party should have an effect. 
Second, the votes cast for left-wing parties may also reflect the preferences of the 
population for spending on different sectors. To further account for left- and right-
wing parties prioritizing different sectors, I include dummies for when left-wing and 
right-wing parties are in the majority, i.e. have more then 50 percent of the votes. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the demographic composition of the electorate has also been 
used  to  describe  the  identity  of  the  median  voter  in  empirical  studies.  Thus,  age 
                                                            
10 In the 1998 election, and outside the time period of this study, incremental change was introduced 
which for the first time enabled the electorate to vote for an individual candidate. For this reason, I will 
not include observations after 1998.   12 
variables pick up both cost differences and median voter effects. Female participation 
rates will also  be included to pick up further cost differences, since the need for 
childcare should be greater when many women work outside the home. For the period 
1985-1997, there is data available at the municipality level on the share of women in 
the workforce aged between 20 and 64. When studying the longer time period, I use a 
county-level  measure  of  the  share  of  women  in  the  workforce.
11  Population  is 
included in case it affects the relative price of the different services. To control for 
further possible median voter effects, a battery of other variables will be included, 
such as the share of women in the population, the share of the population with higher 
education and municipality mean income. Data on mean income and women in the 
population is available for the whole period, whereas data on higher education only 
exists  from  1985.  See  Table  A:2  for  an  overview  of  the  variables,  i.e.  detailed 
description, data sources and summary statistics.  
 
The general idea is that if policy decisions are entirely decided by the electorate, only 
variables describing the municipality’s demographic composition should explain the 
spending pattern, and the composition of the local council should have no explanatory 
power. Inspecting the correlation matrix, Table A:3 in the Appendix reveals a positive 
correlation  between  women  on  the  council  and  spending  on  childcare,  relative  to 
education and elderly care. There is a larger share of women in the council in left-
wing  municipalities,  but  no  or  little  correlation  between  left-wing  votes  and  the 
spending pattern. The age group variables are, as expected, correlated with spending 
on the associated sectors and the share of women working is positively correlated 
with spending on childcare. 
 
Following the results from section 2, there are three equations to estimate, one for 
each spending ratio. The general specification is: 
 
yit =b zit +g Xit + lt + vi + eit, 
 
where yit denotes a particular spending ratio in a municipality in a specific year, zit is 
the  representation  of  women  in  the  local  council  and  Xit  is  the  vector  of  control 
                                                            
11 There were 25 counties in 1976-1992 and 21 counties in 1993-1997.  
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variables mentioned above. For the rest, lt is a time-specific effect, constant over 
municipalities, vi is a municipal-specific effect, constant over time, and eit is the usual 
residual. 
 
During  the  period  1976-1997,  Statistics  Sweden  has  made  some  changes  in  the 
definitions of different categorizes of spending, with major revisions in 1978, 1988 
and 1995. There have also been some changes in the responsibility of some areas 
between different levels of government during the period. Including year fixed effects 
is one way of controlling for common shocks for all municipalities. The quality of 
data with regards to comparability across municipalities should be very good, since 
Statistics Sweden spends considerable resources to ensure this is the case. 
 
Naturally,  the  advantage  of  using  panel  data  is  that  we  may  hold  constant 
municipality-specific  and  time-specific  influences  on  spending.  Municipality  fixed 
effects control for time invariant differences across municipalities that may influence 
policy choices. Year effects should pick up two types of effects. As mentioned above, 
they should take into account any impact on the policy outcome of common shocks to 
the municipalities. Second, if politicians can act according to their own preferences, 
the trend should comply with the politicians’ average preferences. The analysis of 
preferences in Section 2 focused on the difference between men and women. For 
example, women, relative to men, were found to regard childcare as a more important 
area than elderly care. However, both men and women did in fact state elderly care to 
be the highest priority sector. Therefore, we expect that over time, municipalities will 
allocate a larger share of the budget to elderly care and that the year fixed effects will 




3.3.1 Female representation and spending pattern 
Table  5  presents  the  results  from  the  basic  panel  regressions  for  the  full  set  of 
municipalities.  All  specifications  include  the  control  variables  described  in  the 
previous section and municipality and time fixed effects  
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According to the preference study in Section 2, the effect of women’s representation 
should affect spending on childcare and education relative to elderly care and have no 
impact on spending on childcare relative to education. The results presented in Table 
4 suggest this is the case. Inspecting the first column, we see that the share of women 
on the local council has a positive effect on spending on childcare relative to spending 
on elderly care in the period 1976-1997. The next column shows there is no effect of 
women on the council on spending on childcare relative to education. Finally, the last 
column shows that spending on education relative spending on elderly care increases 
with the share of women on the council. 
 
How large are the effects of women’s representation on the spending ratios? To judge 
this, we can do the following thought experiment: suppose the share of women on the 
council  increases  with  one  standard  deviation  (about  9  percentage  points),  then 
spending on childcare relative to elderly care increases with about 10 percent for the 
municipality with the mean level of spending.
12 The same calculation for the results in 
column three shows that spending on childcare relative to elderly care increases with 
almost 5 percent. 
 
According to the study of politicians’ preferences in Section 2, left-wing politicians 
considered childcare to be the most important sector. The results indeed show that the 
share of left-wing votes increases spending on childcare relative to the other sectors.  
There is, however, not any additional effect when the left-wing party is in majority. 
The demand for childcare is also strongly related to the female participation rate. An 
increase in the share of women in the population favors spending on elderly care in 
relation  to  other  sectors.  Population  increases  are  also  positively  correlated  with 
spending on elderly. 
 
(Table 5 here) 
 
Higher female participation rates should increase the demand for childcare, which 
they also do according to the results in Table 5. The measure available for the longer 
time period exists, however, only on county level. The specification presented in the 
first,  third  and  fifth  columns  in  Table  6  uses  female  participation  rate  on  the  
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municipality level rather than county level. In addition, one may worry that a more 
educated population priorities education and elected female politicians. To control for 
this I include the share of population with higher education. In column two, four and 
six, each municipality is allowed its own time trend to control for unobservable time 
varying effects. 
 
The results in Table 6 show that the results are robust to the inclusion of the control 
variables and the municipality specific time trends. A larger share of highly educated 
representatives  seems  to  increase  spending  on  education  and  elderly  care.  The 
municipality level measure of female participation rates yields the same results as in 
the previous table. Including the time trends reduces the estimated coefficients, but 
there is still a statistically significant effect of female representation on the spending 
pattern. Note that municipality specific trends will, however, not only pick up effects 
of  changes  in  unobservables,  but  also  some  of  the  effect  of  increased  female 
representation on the spending pattern, since most municipalities increased their share 
of women in the council continuously over the period. 
 
(Table 6 here) 
 
3.3.2 Other measures of women’s representation 
How should we measure the bargaining strengths of elected representatives on local 
councils?  In  the  previous  specifications  I  have  used  the  share  of  women  on  the 
council, reflecting that all elected representatives may have some bargaining power in 
the  budget  process,  possibly  because  they  can  highlight  these  issues  in  council 
meetings and in the media, even though they are not part of the majority. If, on the 
other hand, the ruling parties alone determine the allocation of resources, only the 
bargaining strength of women in the majority is important for policy decisions. Table 
7 presents the results from using the share of women in the majority as a proxy for 
female  bargaining  power  in  the  council.
13  There  are  possibly  some  measurement 
problems with this variable, since parties on the local level sometimes form coalitions 
with parties across the normal bloc boundaries and I only have access to the election 
                                                                                                                                                                      
12 Calculated as follows: (0.089´0.993)/0.849.   16 
results.  Moreover,  there  are  cases  when  not  all  left-wing  (right-wing)  parties  are 
included in the left-wing (right-wing) majority. Notice also that this variable only is 
available for a shorter time period. The results presented in the first three columns 
show  the  same  pattern  as  the  previous  tables:  women’s  representation  increases 
spending on childcare and education at the expense of elderly care.   
 
Another concern may be that women’s representation needs to reach a certain level to 
matter  for  the  decision  process  (see  e.g.  Dahlerup,  1989).  In  this  case,  a  linear 
approximation of the effect would not be appropriate. To better capture the effect I 
include three dummies representing different levels of women’s representation. The 
results presented in the three last columns suggest that moving from less than 20 
percent women in the local council to between 20-29 percent has no effect on the 
spending pattern. Interestingly, the results suggest that women’s representation needs 
to reach at least 30 percent before representation in the local council translates into 
changes  in  policy.  Spending  on  childcare  relative  to  elderly  care  and  education 
relative to elderly care is highest when the share of women in the council is more the 
40 percent.  There is also a small, but statistically significant, effect of women in the 
council on spending on childcare relative to education when moving to between 30 
and 39 percent. However, increasing women’s representation reduces the spending 
ratio even more, back to the level when the share of women on the council was below 
30 percent. This last result is slightly difficult to interpret. 
 
 (Table 7 here) 
 
3.3.3 Dynamic effects 
The panel results presented so far have been static. There may, however, be high 
persistence  in  the  spending  pattern  suggesting  that  a  dynamic  model  is  more 
appropriate. The within estimator will be biased and inconsistent in a dynamic set-up 
unless the panel consists of many time periods. When estimating dynamic models, 
one  can  use  transformations  that  allow  the  use  of  lagged  endogenous  and 
predetermined variables as instruments for the transformed equations. Efficient GMM 
                                                                                                                                                                      
13 The number of women in the majority divided by the number of seats belonging to the majority. 
There is a left-wing majority if SAP + VP obtains more than 50 percent of the votes and a right-wing 
majority if M +Fp+Kd+C obtain more than 50 percent of the votes.  
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(generalized method-of-moments estimator) of this type are discussed in Arellano and 
Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998).  
 
Table  8  displays  the  results  from  a  dynamic  model  where  the  lagged  dependent 
variable has been instrumented using the GMM method. The first three columns use 
the share of women in the council as proxy for women’s representation, and the last 
three use the share of women in the majority. The Sargan test of over-identifying 
restrictions  is  used  to  control  the  model  specification  and  the  validity  of  the 
instruments.  The  consistency  of  the  GMM  estimator  depends  heavily  upon  the 
assumption  of  no  second-order  autocorrelation  in  the  first-differences  errors. 
Therefore, Table 8 also shows the test statistic of an AR(2) test.  
 
The lag structure that seems to fit the data is to use two lags. As is evident from the 
results there is large persistence in the data. The proxies for women’s representation 
show the same pattern as in previous tables. Using a dynamic panel, we are now able 
to  study  the  long  and  short  term  effects  of  women’  representation  on  spending 
patterns. Using the same thought experiment as in section 3.3.1, when calculating the 
effect estimated in the first column, we see that the short term effect on increased 
women’s representation is almost 4 percent and the long term effect is 7 percent.  
 
(Table 8 here) 
 
3.3.4 Differences between the left-wing and right-wing bloc 
The results from the preference study in Section 2 suggest some differences between 
left-wing and right-wing parties. The predictions from the preference study are that in 
left-wing  parties,  women  prefer  spending  on  child  care  and  education  relative  to 
elderly  care.  In  right-wing  parties,  the  differences  between  men’s  and  women’s 
priorities centre around spending on child care relative to elderly care. 
 
Interactions between the share of women in the council, and dummies for right-wing 
respective majority, are included to test the predictions. As can be seen in the first 
column of Table 9, there is a significant effect of women’s representation on spending 
on childcare relative to elderly care in both samples. There are no significant effects 
of the share of women on the council on spending on childcare relative to education   18 
(column two), while there is again a positive effect of the share of women in the 
council  on  spending  on  education  relative  to  elderly  care,  especially  in  left-wing 
majorities (column three). There is, however, still a smaller but positive effect of 
women’s representation on spending on education relative to elderly care in right-
wing  parties,  which  is  not  in  line  with  the  predictions.  Next  we  turn  to  another 
measure of women’s representation: the share of women in the majority. Inspecting 
the  first  row  in  the  second  panel  of  Table  9  we  see  that  the  effect  of  women’s 
representation in left-wing majorities is in line with the predictions. The effect of 
women’s  representation  in  right-wing  majorities  is  not  entirely  according  to  the 
predicted effects. In particular, there is a positive effect on spending on education 
relative to elderly care, which is not predicted from the preferences study. 
 
In sum, there is some support for the predictions derived in section 2, especially for 
left-wing  parties.  For  right-wing  parties,  the  results  are  not  entirely  in  line  with 
predictions.   
 
(Table 9 here) 
 
3.3.5 Political competition and the impact of women’s representation 
Models of electoral competition show that political competition limits the possibility 
for elected representatives to further their own interest. In most theoretical models, 
this is modeled as rents that accrue to the politician or the political party in power (see 
Persson and Tabellini, 2000 for an overview of political agency models and Svaleryd 
and Vlachos, 2007 for an example in the context of a probabilistic voting model). It is 
not  always  clear  what  these  rents  are,  but  empirical  studies  have  studied  money 
transfers and slack and inefficiencies in policy making (Besley et al, 2007, Besley and 
Case,  2003  and  Svaleryd  and  Vlachos,  2007). Another  way  to  further  one’s  own 
interest  is  to  make  policy  choices  according  to  one’s  own  preferences.  An  early 
contribution to this literature is Kalt and Zupan (1984) who discuss the nature of these 
rents  and  write  quote  [  ..,  shirking  by  legislators  may  focus  on  nonpecuniary 
perquisites  of  holding  office..  The  perquisites  of  political  office  range  from  “fact 
finding” junkets and ….prestige, and the ability to use the power of government to 
impose one’s own pet theories of the “good” society.] The prediction would in the 
context of this study then be that politicians’ preferences for different sectors should  
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have a greater influence on policy in municipalities characterized with weak electoral 
incentives.   
 
This  hypothesis  is  tested  on  the  data.  A  commonly  used  measure  of  electoral 
incentives or political competition is the absolute difference between the vote share of 
the  left-  and  right-wing  blocs  (see  e.g.  Besley  and  Case,  2003  and  Svaleryd  and 
Vlachos,  2007).  Political  competition  is  then  weaker  the  larger  the  differences 
between the vote shares of the two blocs. Here, Political competition is defined as 1 
minus the absolute difference between blocs. To study if women’s representation in 
the  local  council  has  a  greater  effect  on  the  spending  pattern  when  political 
competition  is  weak,  the  measure  of  political  competition  is  interacted  with  the 
measure of women’s representation.  
 
The results presented in Table 10 lend some support to the hypothesis that political 
competition reduces the independence of the legislator and thus the impact of personal 
preferences on policy. The results using the share of women in the majority, presented 
in the last three columns, are exactly in line with the predictions. The share of women 
in the majority increases spending on childcare relative to elderly care, but less so 
when political competition is strong (column four). There is also a positive effect of 
political competition on childcare spending relative to spending on elderly care. One 
interpretation  is  that  on  average  the  council  does  not  adequately  represent  the 
electorate, in particular, by not furthering the interests of women and by putting too 
low a priority on childcare relative to elderly care. This same pattern is evident for 
spending  on  education  relative  to  elderly  care  (see  results  presented  in  the  last 
column). According to the results in the fifth column, there are no effects on spending 
on childcare relative to education by changes in the share of women in the majority.  
 
The share  of women  in the council, however, seems to  have  a positive  effect on 
spending on childcare relative to elderly care when political competition is strong. 
The results in column one and three display the same pattern as for the other measure 
of women’s representation, the share of women in the majority, although the results 
are not statistically significant.   
  
(Table 10 here)   20 
 
4. Conclusion  
Male and female local politicians prioritize different sectors. These differences shape 
local spending patterns, since women’s representation on municipal councils is shown 
to affect how the resources are divided across sectors. This study provides further 
evidence for the idea that the identity of the elected representative is important for 
policy decisions, thereby supporting the results found in Chattopadhyay and Duflo 
(2004) and Besley and Case (2003).  
 
This study is not able to fully control for endogeneity of women’s representation, i.e. 
that something else is determining both the share of women in the council and the 
spending pattern.  However, several results point in the same direction. In a survey, 
female and male politicians show different priorities across sectors. These differences 
appear in the data when studying the spending pattern in a panel. The results are 
robust to a number of robustness checks. Moreover, women’s representation has a 
larger  effect  when  political  competition  is  weak,  suggesting  that  politicians’  own 
preferences have a greater impact when (re)electoral incentives are weak.   
 
One  potential  policy  conclusion  would  be  that women  need  to  be  represented  on 
elected assemblies for their opinions to be taken into account. This would, however, 
assume that female politicians and female voters have the same policy preferences. 
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) show some evidence of this being the case in their 
study of Indian villages, as women leaders seem to address, to a greater extent, the 
concerns of women in the village. However, there is also some evidence that the 
preferences  of  voters  and  politicians  may  not  coincide.  In  a  study  of  Swedish 
municipalities,  Ågren  et  al  (2007)  find  that  female  politicians  have  significantly 
different spending preferences than female voters.  
 
The  focus  here  has  been  on  gender  as  a  determinant  of  spending.  Clearly,  other 
dimensions  of  local  council composition  could  also affect  policy.  For  example, a 
municipality  with  older  politicians  is  likely  to  spend  more  on  the  elderly.  Other 
characteristics,  such  as ethnic  group  and  occupation,  may  also  be  correlated  with  
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preferences and therefore have an impact on policy decisions. There is clearly room 




Question  from  a  survey  of  local  government  politicians. 
(Kommunalpolitikerundersökningen, 1979-1980 SSD0101 and 1993 SSD 0459). 
  
For each of the three sectors, childcare, education and elderly care, the respondents 
answered the following question:  
 
Do you think it is important that your municipality does more than at present, its 
present effort is essentially sufficient, its present effort can be reduced, or you do not 
have an opinion? 
 
A.  Important to do more 
B.  Sufficient as it is 
C.  Can be reduced 
D.  Do not know / no opinion. 
 
(Own translation)  
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Table A:1 Descriptive statistics for the study in Section 2. 
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation  N obs 
       
Female  0.300  0.458  1948 
Childcare/ Elderly care  2.728  0.627  1910 
Childcare/ Education  2.839  0.666  1910 
Education/ Elderly care  2.884  0.630  1910 
Data source: Kommunalpolitikerundersökningen 1979-80 SSD 0101 and 
 1993 SSD 0459 
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Table A:2. Descriptive statistics and data sources for data used in Sections 3. 
Variable  Source  Mean  Std.d  N obs 
         
Childcare / elderly care: Spending on childcare divided by spending on 
elderly care. 
SS
1  0.849  0.815  5436 
Childcare / education: spending on childcare divided by spending on 
education. 
SS
1  0.635  0.278  5603 
Education / elderly care: Spending on education divided by spending on 
elderly care.  
SS
1  1.297  0.8245  5425 
         
         
Women on the local council: The number of women on the local council 




0.302  0.089  5880 
Women in the majority: The number of women in the majority divided 
by the number of seats belonging to the majority. There is a left-wing 
majority if SAP + VP obtains more than 50 percent of the votes and a 
right-wing majority if M +Fp+Kd+C obtain more than 50 percent of the 
votes. 
SS  0.334  0.100  3582 
Left-wing votes: The share of votes cast on SAP, VP and Mp.  SS  0.497  0.118  5880 
Left-wing majority: A dummy that takes the value 1 when the left-wing 
parties have more then 50 percent of the votes 
SS  0.484  0.500  5880 
Right-wing majority: A dummy that takes the value 1 when the right-
wing parties have more then 50 percent of the votes 
SS  0.425     0.494  5880 
Political competition: 1- absolute differences between left-wing and 
right-wing votes. 
SS  0.812      0.138  5880     
Ages 0-6: The share of the population between 0 and 6.   SS  0.089  0.012  5880 
Ages 7-15: The share of the population between 7 and 15.  SS  0.121  0.017  5880 
Ages 65 and older: The share of the population older than 65.  SS  0.180  0.042  5880 
Mean income: Taxable personal income per person. Deflated using KPI 
to 1997 year prices. 
SS
3  84876  14289  5880 
Women in the population: The share of women in the population.  SS  0.499  0.013  5880 
Population: size of population.
  SS  27269  45942  5880 
Women’s participation rate in the sample 1974-1997: The share of 
women who are part of the workforce and not unemployed at the county 
level.  
SS  0.733  0.050  5880 
Women’s participation rate 1985-1997: The share of working women 
aged 20-64 in November. 
SS  0.768  0.057  3212 
High education: Share of the population with three years or more of 
higher education. 
SS  0.099  0.045  3482 
SS (Statistics Sweden) www.scb.se, SALAR (The Swedish Association of Local Authorities and 
Regions).   
1 Data from “räkenskapssammandraget” collected by Statistics Sweden and calculated by Per 
Pettersson-Lidbom 1974-1989. 1988-1997 data published in “How much do local public services cost 
in Sweden?”  
2 Published in “Kommunlat förtroendevalda. Parti och kön nämndorganisation lokala organ” 1977 and 
1980 
3 Published in “Statistical yearbook of administrative districts of Sweden.” 
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Appendix A:3 Correlation matrix for variables used in Sections 3. 




















Pop  High 
edu 
                               
Child/elderly  1.000                             
Child/edu  0.464  1.000                           
Edu/elderly  0.900  0.110  1.000                         
Women in  
council 
0.160  0.348  0.012  1.000                       
Women in  
majority 
0.078  0.294  -0.066  0.867  1.000                     
Left-wing  -0.097  0.027  -0.133  0.240  0.358  1.000                   
Age06  0.156  0.104  0.142  0.238  0.166  -0.300  1.000                 
Age715  0.418  -0.082  0.547  -0.154  -0.212  -0.329  0.368  1.000               
Age65  -0.682  -0.430  -0.621  -0.241  -0.140  0.109  -0.557  -0.572  1.000             
Women work (county)  0.529  0.115  0.597  -0.251  -0.311  -0.177  -0.213  0.249  -0.176  1.000           
Women work(mun)  0.560  0.207  0.596  -0.215  0.438  -0.219  -0.096  0.351  -0.339  0.839  1.000         
Mean income  0.411  0.522  0.252  0.538  0.109  -0.012  0.290  -0.109  -0.509  0.045  0.139  1.000       
Women pop  0.269  0.474  0.145  0.191  0.228  -0.230  0.036  -0.017  -0.237  0.226  0.312  0.466  1.000     
Pop  0.154  0.473  0.008  0.234  -0.296  -0.000  -0.030  -0.212  -0.146  0.093  0.078  0.328  0.435  1.000   
High edu  0.347  0.540  0.174  0.482  0.375  -0.214  0.347  -0.006  -0.505  -0.042  0.077  0.812  0.587  0.423  1.000   26 
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 Table 1. Illustration of the coding of survey responses. 
    Childcare 
    Less  Same  More 
Less  3  4  5 
Same  2  3  4 
 
Elderly care 
More  1  2  3 
 
 Table 2. Politicians’ preferences over sectors.  
  Childcare/ elderly care  Childcare/ education  Education/ elderly care 
       
Woman  0.338***  0.028  0.274** 
  (2.68)  (0.30)  (2.22) 
Left-wing  1.062***  1.066***  -0.046 
  (7.76)  (8.89)  (0.34) 
Year 1993  -2.430***  -1.072***  -1.804*** 
  (24.85)  (14.28)  (28.19) 
       
Municipality – year   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Effects       
       
Pseudo R
2  0.078  0.100  0.061 
Obs  1910  1910  1910 
Estimated using ordered logit and standard errors are clustered on municipality. T-
statistics in parentheses. *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, ** 5 % and * 10% 
level. 
  
Table 3. Left-wing politicians’ preferences over sectors 
  Childcare/ elderly care  Childcare/ education  Education/ elderly care 
       
Women  0.520***  -0.151  0.549*** 
  (3.53)  (1.11)  (3.58) 
Year 1993  -2.014***  -1.542***  -0.175*** 
  (13.02)  (15.29)  (2.65) 
       
Municipality – year   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Effects       
       
Pseudo R
2  0.097  0.143  0.101 
Obs  935  930  933 
Only individuals from the Social Democrats, the Environmental Party and the Left Party 
are included. Estimated using ordered logit and standard errors are clustered on 
municipality. T-statistics in parentheses. *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, ** 
5 % and * 10% level. 
  
Table 4. Right-wing politicians’ preferences over sectors 
  Childcare/ elderly care  Childcare/ education  Education/ elderly care 
       
Women  0.297*  0.222  0.060 
  (1.75)  (1.44)  (0.37) 
Year 1993  -0.780***  -1.454***  0.733*** 
  (13.38)  (16.55)  (13.95) 
       
Municipality – year   Yes  Yes  Yes 
Effects       
       
Pseudo R
2  0.062  0.072  0.084 
Obs  975  980  977 
Only individuals from the Moderate Party, the Liberal Party, the Center Party and the 
Christian Democratic Party are included. Estimated using ordered logit and standard 
errors are clustered on municipality. T-statistics in parentheses. *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, ** 5 % and * 10% level 
  


































Standard errors are clustered on municipality level and t-statistics are presented in parentheses.  
** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, ** 5 % and * 10% level. All variables not 
 expressed as shares, i.e Population and Average income, are in log-form. 
  Childcare/elderly  Childcare/education  Education/elderly 
Period  1976-1997  1976-1997  1976-1997 
       
Women in council  0.993  0.104  0.715 
  (3.39)***  (1.36)  (3.19)*** 
       
Left-wing  0.955  0.404  0.473 
  (2.21)**  (3.24)***  (1.37) 
Left-wing majority  0.002  0.004  -0.029 
  (0.04)  (0.22)  (0.77) 
Right-wing majority  -0.060  -0.014  -0.031 
  (1.22)  (0.85)  (0.83) 
Share age 0-6  -7.638  1.513   
  (2.28)**  (2.77)***   
Share age 7-15    -2.462  17.240 
    (4.19)***  (7.91)*** 
Share age 65+  -15.028    -11.195 
  (5.14)***    (6.07)*** 
Women working  3.810  1.094  0.987 
  (4.15)***  (4.09)***  (1.67)* 
Mean income  -0.078  0.292  -0.297 
  (0.23)  (2.42)**  (1.07) 
Women in pop  -1.770  0.137  -3.269 
  (1.43)  (0.19)  (1.95)* 
Population  -2.068  -0.137  -2.118 
  (5.03)***  (1.80)*  (6.25)*** 
       
Year FE  yes  yes  yes 
Mun. FE  yes  yes  yes 
       
Obs  5436  5603  5425 
R
2  0.84  0.84  0.88  
Table 6. Alternative specifications. 












Period  1985-1997  1976-1997  1985-1997  1976-1997  1985-1997  1976-1997 
             












             
Left-wing  0.638  0.356  0.314  0.322  0.239  -0.226 
  (1.20)  (0.83)  (2.27)**  (2.28)**  (0.57)  (0.74) 
Left-wing maj.  -0.031  0.049  -0.006  0.009  -0.054  0.029 
  (0.67)  (1.22)  (0.42)  (0.52)  (1.29)  (0.84) 
Right-wing maj.  -0.102  -0.050  -0.020  -0.017  -0.074  -0.015 
  (2.39)**  (1.16)  (1.69)*  (0.84)  (1.96)*  (0.51) 
Share age 0-6  -10.240  -20.890  1.780  0.871     
  (2.46)**  (5.61)***  (1.17)  (1.00)     
Share age 7-15      -3.616  -2.431  18.119  4.374 
      (2.27)**  (3.19)***  (4.38)***  (2.46)** 
Share age 65+  -26.506  -10.769      -20.937  -9.516 
  (5.82)***  (3.22)***      (6.42)***  (3.81)*** 
Women working  2.096  0.920  1.370  0.513  0.020  0.023 
  (3.01)***  (1.73)*  (6.24)***  (2.35)**  (0.03)  (0.06) 
Mean income  0.236  0.244  0.619  -0.183  0.106  0.459 
  (0.39)  (0.64)  (3.04)***  (1.39)  (0.20)  (1.86)* 
Women in pop  -2.931  6.563  4.693  1.824  -14.294  -1.367 
  (1.03)  (2.88)***  (2.22)**  (1.59)  (3.94)***  (0.72) 
Population  -3.758  3.059  -0.077  0.487  -3.740  0.417 
  (3.82)***  (2.58)**  (0.40)  (1.25)  (4.29)***  (0.51) 
Higher education  -5.330    -3.198    2.742   
  (2.22)**    (2.05)**    (1.28)   
             
Year FE  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Mun. FE  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Mun.trends  no  Yes  no  yes  no  yes 
             
Obs  3158  5436  3069  5603  3023  5425 
R
2  0.86  0.91  0.83  0.88  0.87  0.92 
Standard errors are clustered on municipality level and t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, ** 5 % and * 10% level. In columns 1, 3 and 5, the measure for the share 
of working women in the population is a municipality-level measure of women in the workforce and in 
columns 2, 4 and 6, the measure of women working is on the county level. All variables not expressed as 
shares, i.e Population and Average income, are in log-form.  
  
 
Table 7. Other proxies for women’s representation. 












Period  1976-1997  1976-1997  1976-1997  1985-1997  1985-1997  1985-1997 
             








     
             








     
             








     
             






             
Control variables  yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year FE  yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes 
Mun. FE  yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes 
             
Obs  5436  5603  5425  2801  2739  2701 
R
2  0.84  0.84  0.88  0.85  0.83  0.87 
Standard errors are clustered on municipality level and t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, ** 5 % and * 10% level. Control variables in the first three columns are 
the same as in Table 4 and in the last three columns the same as in Table 5 column 1, 3 and 5. 
  
Table 8. Dynamic specification. 












Period  1976-1997  1976-1997  1976-1997  1985-1997  1985-1997  1985-1997 
             
             
y(t-1)  0.780  0.758  0.633  0.573  0.606  0.571 
  (13.17)***  (23.51)***  (13.67)***  (7.12)***  (14.61)***  (8.51)*** 
y(t-2)  0.146  0.076  0.187  0.292  0.123  0.201 
  (2.91)***  (2.21)**  (5.70)***  (6.18)***  (4.07)***  (4.27)*** 
             








     
Women in  
majority 






             
             
Control variables  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year FE  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Mun. FE  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
             
# of instruments  242  249  242  223  224  223 
AR(2) p-value  0.464  0.929  0.186  0.165  0.106  0.092 
Hansen OID 
 p-value 
0.134  0.308  0.105  0.183  0.233  0.246 
             
Obs  4660  5387  4704  2659  2682  2573 
Standard errors are clustered on municipality level and t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, ** 5 % and * 10% level. Estimations are made using the command 
xtabond2 in STATA 9.2 developed by Roodman (see Roodman, 2006). All specifications use the two-step 
estimation with Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix. All variables are 
treated as predetermined, except for the year dummies which are treated as exogenous. AR(2) is the 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences and below is the p-value from the Hansen test of overid. 
restrictions presented. Control variables in the first three columns are the same as in Table 4 and in the last 
three columns the same as in Table 5 column 1, 3 and 5, except that dummies for left-wing and right-wing 
majorities are left out. The reason for this is to reduce the number of instruments. Including the dummies 
for majorities have no effect on the results. The instruments are also collapsed to further limit the number 
of instruments. 
                 
 Table 9. Interactions, women’s representation and political majority. 
























                 








         



































































         
                 
Control 
variables 
Yes  yes  yes      yes  yes  yes 
Year FE  Yes  yes  yes      yes  yes  yes 
Mun. FE  Yes  yes  yes      yes  yes  yes 
                 
Obs  5953  6120  5955      2801  2739  2701 
R
2  0.83  0.85  0.87      0.66  0.83  0.87 
Standard errors are clustered on municipality level and t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, ** 5 % and * 10% level. Control variables in the first three columns are 
the same as in Table 4 and in the last three columns the same as in Table 5 column 1, 3 and 5. 
 
 Table 10. Interactions with political competition.   
























                 
Women in   1.137  -0.294  1.013    Women   2.172  -0.149  1.926 
council  (1.77)*  (1.40)  (1.64)    in maj.  (2.35)**  (0.55)  (2.32)** 









  Women 









        political 
comp 
     
                 
Political   0.122  -0.191  0.104      0.561  -0.162  0.611 
competition  (0.54)  (2.29)**  (0.46)      (1.69)*  (1.30)  (1.80)* 
                 
Control 
variables 
Yes  yes  yes      yes  yes  yes 
Year FE  Yes  yes  yes      yes  yes  yes 
Mun. FE  Yes  yes  yes      yes  yes  yes 
                 
Obs  5436  5603  5425      2801  2739  2701 
R
2  0.84  0.84  0.88      0.85  0.83  0.87 
Standard errors are clustered on municipality level and t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, ** 5 % and * 10% level. Control variables in the first three columns are 
the same as in Table 4 and in the last three columns the same as in Table 5 column 1, 3 and 5. 
 